A look inside Pakistan’s military manpower exports and their impact on Middle East geopolitics
I. Contextualizing Pakistan’s role in Gulf security architecture
Pakistan maintains an extensive and complex security footprint across the Arab Gulf states, rooted in decades of strategic cooperation. This relationship, which encompasses the deployment of active-duty military personnel and the widespread employment of retired officers, is a critical feature of the Gulf’s defense ecosystem. The relationship serves as a foundational pillar for regional security capacity building and simultaneously acts as a crucial lever in Pakistan’s geo-economic foreign policy strategy.
A. Historical genesis: The era of capacity building (1960s–1980s)
Pakistan’s military expertise began to be formally solicited by Gulf monarchies during the period of the oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s. The rapid increase in economic wealth and geostrategic importance necessitated the development of robust, professional security forces that nascent local populations could not immediately staff or command.
The initial framework for military cooperation was established through a series of defense protocols signed during the 1970s with several Arab countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, and others. These agreements primarily facilitated the deputation of personnel from the Pakistan Air Force, Army, and Navy to provide military training, technical assistance, and support the establishment of local security forces.
Specifically regarding KSA, bilateral defense ties developed in the 1960s, driven largely by Riyadh’s concern over the Egyptian military intervention in Yemen. A formal security cooperation arrangement was finalized in 1967. This foundational cooperation was later codified by the 1982 Organization Agreement, which formally allowed Pakistani troops to be stationed in the Kingdom for training purposes, an arrangement inked three years after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. During the peak era of cooperation, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 Pakistani military personnel were serving abroad, with an estimated 20,000 deployed in Saudi Arabia alone.
B. Contemporary strategic shift: Geo-economics and diversification
The contemporary security partnership is driven by evolving strategic imperatives on both sides. For Pakistan, military cooperation is intrinsically linked to geo-economics, a central pillar of its current foreign policy. Islamabad has actively leveraged its security guarantees to attract massive foreign direct investments, notably seeking $75 billion to $100 billion from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. This engagement combines security guarantees with vital economic incentives, offering Pakistan a pathway to address its persistent and severe domestic economic challenges through engagement with resource-rich Arab partners.
For the Gulf states, particularly KSA, the goal is diversification of security architecture. Riyadh is consciously shifting away from exclusive reliance on Washington following persistent regional threats, such as those posed by the Houthis. The landmark defense pact signed with nuclear-armed Pakistan highlights this evolving strategic calculus, enabling KSA to tap into Pakistan’s extensive, professional military expertise and established deterrence capabilities to bolster regional stability and counter pro-Iranian threats. The recent volatility in the region, exemplified by the Israeli strikes in Doha in September 2025, further accelerated KSA’s decision to strengthen its formalized defense ties with Pakistan.
C. Defining operational status: Formal Secondment versus Private Military Contractors (PMCs)
A clear distinction must be maintained between personnel serving in an official, active-duty capacity (secondment) and those employed privately (contractors or advisors).
- Formal Secondment (Active Duty): These individuals are active, uniformed members of the Pakistan Armed Forces (PAF). Their deployment is temporary and sanctioned via formal bilateral defense protocols or Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Crucially, seconded personnel remain under the legal and military code of the PAF, meaning their command structure, pay, and disciplinary actions are governed by Pakistani military law, although they operate in support of the host nation’s defense goals.
- Private Military and Security Contractors (PMCs) / Strategic Advisors: This category consists predominantly of individuals who have officially retired from the PAF, often at senior or technical ranks. They are hired directly by the host government, a specific branch of the host military, or an associated security firm. These individuals are subject to contractual law and the military or security direction of the host nation, not the PAF. They operate outside the official military secondment numbers provided by Islamabad. The legal distinction is significant; unlike seconded regulars who are protected by international conventions as military personnel of a sovereign state, retired contractors who engage in armed conflict under certain terms may risk classification as mercenaries, potentially losing the protections afforded to official combatants.
II. Official Military Secondment: Active-duty deployments (the regulars)
The Pakistan Armed Forces currently maintain official deployments in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with these contingents being an acknowledged part of Pakistan’s foreign policy and defense calculus.
A. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA):
Formalization and Enhanced Deterrence
KSA currently hosts the largest officially recognized contingent of active Pakistani personnel: 2,600 troops. This number was recently bolstered by an additional 1,000 troops deployed in February 2018, supplementing the approximately 1,600 officers and troops already stationed under the 1982 security protocol.
Mandate and the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA)
The formal mandate for the active-duty Pakistani military deployment is restricted to “training and advice” missions. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, has explicitly affirmed that these troops are deployed solely within the Kingdom and “will not be employed outside KSA”. This restriction reflects Pakistan’s strategic decision to avoid entanglement in external conflicts, notably its refusal to join the Arab Coalition against the Houthis in 2015.
The security dynamic, however, has been profoundly altered by the signing of the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) on September 17, 2025. This pact, signed amidst rising regional tensions including the continued Houthi threat and immediate geopolitical fallout from the Israeli strikes in Doha contains language echoing NATO’s collective defense commitment. The text stipulates that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”.
The official denial of an external combat role for the 2,600 personnel does not diminish their strategic significance. The commitment formalized by the SMDA, combined with the presence of an active, uniformed contingent, transforms the deployment from a purely advisory mission into a strategic political “tripwire” force. The deployment’s utility lies in its political and strategic signaling. The physical presence of a Pakistani contingent, backed by a collective defense pact with a nuclear power, significantly complicates the risk calculation for KSA’s adversaries, such as Iran or the Houthis, who might contemplate direct aggression against Saudi core interests. The SMDA elevates the threat level associated with attacking KSA, leveraging Pakistan’s military reputation without necessarily requiring direct combat involvement in regional flashpoints like Yemen.
B. The State of Qatar: Specialized Security and Institutional Ties
Qatar hosts an official contingent of approximately 650 active personnel from the Pakistan Armed Forces. The relationship is characterized by specialized security cooperation and institutional ties, demonstrating Pakistan’s capacity to support high-profile security requirements.
Specialized Roles and Expanding Cooperation
Pakistani forces have historically played a vital role in providing large-scale security assistance for major events. For instance, a contingent of 4,058 personnel from the Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force, along with 150 Military Police, was deployed to Qatar to ensure seaward and physical security for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The Pakistan Navy, for example, docked its ship PNS TABUK at Umm al Houl Naval Base to provide seaward security during the event.
Recent high-level exchanges, including President Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to Doha, have sought to significantly expand this defense cooperation. The Pakistani leadership offered to expand collaboration in defense and defense production, an offer positively received by the Qatari Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.
This move toward defense production collaboration suggests a geopolitical shift. Qatar is seeking to diversify its defense sources and develop greater self-sufficiency in the post-blockade era. For Pakistan, transitioning from a mere supplier of military manpower to a strategic defense industry partner presents a significant opportunity. It provides Qatar with strategic military diversity and allows Pakistan to secure a valuable, formalized investment stream that leverages its indigenous defense manufacturing base, aligning military cooperation with the geo-economic agenda. Qatar’s civil and military leadership consistently acknowledges Pakistan’s pivotal role in regional stability and appreciates the professionalism of the Pakistan Armed Forces.
C. The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Focus on Training and High-End Technical Assistance
Unlike KSA and Qatar, current public reports regarding official PAF secondment numbers do not list a specific large-scale, active-duty contingent for the UAE. This indicates that contemporary official Pakistani military assistance to the UAE has shifted toward highly specialized training, technical support, and joint exercises rather than mass security deployment.
Foundational Expertise and Joint Operations
Pakistan’s relationship with the UAE military establishment has historically been one of the deepest in the Gulf. Pakistan was instrumental in the foundational years of the UAE’s defense institutions. Pakistani Navy officers were deployed to train the local naval force, and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has regularly engaged in complex, multi-national aerial combat exercises like “Spears of Victory,” which the UAE also participates in, alongside KSA, France, the UK, and the US. Furthermore, the Pakistan Navy regularly conducts joint exercises with the UAE Navy.
The lack of large, officially cited regular troop deployments suggests that the UAE, which also hosts a vast number of retired Pakistani personnel in key advisory and command roles (discussed in Section III), relies more heavily on the unofficial, experienced contractor pool for routine operations and on formalized joint exercises for interoperability and advanced training.
III. The Shadow Force: Retired Officers and Private Military Contracting
The official military secondment represents only one part of Pakistan’s security contribution to the Gulf. A parallel, yet strategically critical, force consists of thousands of retired Pakistani military personnel who are hired directly by Gulf governments. These individuals function as private military or security contractors (PMCs) or high-level strategic advisors.
A. Legal and Operational Distinction: PMC vs. Regular
The differentiation between a seconded regular and a retired contractor is primarily legal and jurisdictional. Active-duty personnel remain bound by the Pakistan Armed Forces legal structure. Conversely, retired personnel, even if they occupy high-level military positions within the host country, operate under specific employment contracts governed by the host nation’s labor laws and the terms negotiated with the employing entity.
The operational profile also differs: Seconded personnel primarily focus on institutional building, formalized training, and strategic deterrence under state-to-state agreements. Contractors are hired to fill operational capacity gaps, providing technical specialties, high-level strategic advice, and often serving in command structures. The complexity inherent in Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and their contracting arrangements risks strategic incoherence and legal liability due to unclear policies, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing their status from official military deployments.
B. The Magnitude and Role of the Unofficial Force
While official PAF deployments are measured in the hundreds or low thousands (2,600 in KSA, 650 in Qatar), the total number of “retired” Pakistani military personnel serving in security, advisory, and technical roles across the Gulf is estimated to be significantly higher—potentially “many thousands (maybe ten thousand)”.
The UAE’s Historical Reliance
The UAE has historically depended heavily on retired Pakistani officers for establishing its military structures. For example, the first five heads of the UAE Air Force were reportedly retired Pakistani officers. This dependence extends to high-level strategic advisory roles; Pakistan’s former secret service chief, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, became a security advisor to the UAE government upon retirement, highlighting the Gulf states’ reliance on this expertise for strategic direction.
Strategic Rationale for PMCs: Cost Efficiency and Deniability
The sustained preference by Gulf states, particularly the UAE and KSA, for utilizing retired Pakistani staff is driven by key strategic goals: cost efficiency and plausible deniability.
First, these highly skilled personnel are acquired at a significantly lower cost than if the host nations were to staff equivalent roles with their own citizens, who often command high salaries due to national entitlement structures. This arrangement allows Gulf armies to maintain operational capacity at optimal readiness levels while managing national budgets efficiently.
Second, retired personnel provide greater operational flexibility and political distance. Their employment avoids the political visibility and public commitment required by a large active-duty foreign contingent. This structure offers plausible deniability to the host government should sensitive security operations go awry or face international criticism, as the actions cannot be directly attributed to the foreign state (Pakistan) via official secondment protocols. The employment of this unofficial, yet culturally and religiously aligned, security labor force is therefore the essential staff augmentation mechanism enabling Gulf armies to function at their current readiness levels.
IV. Strategic and Economic Interdependencies:
The Quid Pro Quo Analysis
The security relationship between Pakistan and the Gulf states is fundamentally transactional, built on a robust quid pro quo where military expertise is exchanged for economic sustenance and strategic guarantees.
A. Pakistan’s Gains: Economic Stabilization and Modernization Exposure
For Pakistan, the primary gains are economic and technological, critical for maintaining state solvency and military readiness.
Financial Lifeline and Investment Protection
Saudi Arabia has consistently provided essential financial support to prevent Pakistan’s economic collapse, a tacit understanding since the latter part of the Cold War. This includes direct loans, deferred oil payments, and bolstering foreign exchange reserves with billions of dollars. The transactional nature of this relationship is explicit; in October 2024, Pakistan signed Memoranda of Understanding for Saudi investments worth $2.8 billion, in addition to securing a $3 billion loan.
The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) is therefore leveraged to protect these economic interests. By providing security guarantees, the pact aims to attract large-scale Saudi investments, such as the proposed $6 billion brownfield refinery project in Pakistan, by reassuring Saudi stakeholders operating on Pakistani soil.
Technology Access and Military Modernization
The joint military exercises conducted with Gulf states, including the UAE, Qatar, and KSA, offer Pakistan’s Armed Forces critical exposure to modern Western-produced weapon systems and platforms. Due to cooled relations with the United States in recent years, Pakistan often lacks direct access to the latest Western technology. Interacting with Gulf service members during these exercises allows Pakistani personnel to understand the operational workings of these advanced platforms, test them against their own capabilities, and potentially acquire related technologies. This technological exposure is strategically vital, especially as many of these advanced platforms exist in the arsenals of rival states, providing Pakistan with a rare opportunity to map out vulnerabilities and limitations of potential adversaries.
B. Gulf States’ Gains: Professionalism, Deterrence, and Sunni Solidarity
The Gulf states gain access to superior military competence and strategic flexibility through this arrangement.
Military Credibility and Staff Augmentation
Gulf nations benefit immediately from accessing a large pool of professional, battle-hardened military expertise with decades of institutional experience. This access significantly enhances military professionalism and capability against regional threats and non-state actors. Furthermore, the use of Pakistani personnel is favored because the force shares common values and culture, making them a more reliable and cohesive long-term security partner compared to reliance on Western contractors or fragmented local forces.
Strategic Diversification and Deterrence
For KSA, the formalized defense pacts signal a clear move toward diversifying its security portfolio beyond its traditional reliance on Washington. The agreements provide a formalized security guarantee, strengthening deterrence against regional instability and the active threat from the Houthis. The alliance formalizes a unified Sunni front, providing mutual security reinforcement and enhancing Riyadh’s ability to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape of the wider Middle East.
C. The Risk to Strategic Autonomy
The overwhelming reliance on Gulf financial aid to sustain Pakistan’s economy generates a significant constraint on its foreign policy flexibility. The military establishment, which serves as the primary provider of security expertise, has effectively become the guarantor of state solvency. This arrangement risks reducing Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, compelling it to maintain a delicate geopolitical balance. Critics argue that this dependency risks reducing Islamabad to acting as a “rented guard” for Gulf interests.
The core consequence of this economic leverage is the implicit obligation to prioritize Gulf security demands, even when they conflict with Pakistan’s interests elsewhere. This requires careful navigation to avoid entanglement in Saudi-Iran rivalries, which could destabilize Pakistan’s crucial border security. Failure to comply with major security demands could jeopardize the existential economic support required to manage severe fiscal pressures, confirming that military deployments function as an existential foreign policy asset where economic stability is secured at the potential cost of strategic independence.
V. Future Trajectories and Regional Security Implications
A. The SMDA and the Question of Nuclear Ambiguity
The 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement represents a significant formalization of security ties but introduces substantial strategic ambiguity. The pact utilizes the term “aggression,” which is deliberately broader than the NATO standard of “armed attack,” potentially encompassing non-state actor threats, terrorism, proxy attacks, or minor incursions. This lack of clarity regarding operational implementation remains a point of contention for analysts.
Furthermore, despite Pakistan’s nuclear status, the SMDA makes no explicit mention of nuclear deterrence. This omission has fueled ongoing regional speculation regarding whether the pact could project strategic credibility without clear nuclear signaling or institutional planning. The agreement reinforces existing concerns among international observers about Riyadh’s potential short-cut to nuclear capability and the credibility of its nonproliferation commitments, particularly given historical suggestions of Saudi interest in Pakistan’s nuclear program.
The SMDA also underscores a regional preference for deep bilateral security arrangements. Efforts to forge a NATO-style multilateral framework involving multiple Arab states have historically stumbled due to internal Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) political divisions, highlighting why agreements like the SMDA are the primary mechanism for strengthening regional defense cooperation.
B. Geopolitical Balancing and Operational Limitations
The security architecture created by Pakistan’s presence necessitates continuous geopolitical balancing.
Internal Military Strain
The operational capacity of Pakistan to fully meet potential aggressive SMDA demands is constrained by its existing security commitments. Pakistan’s Armed Forces are already stretched by significant domestic security operations and ongoing tensions along its borders with India and Afghanistan. This domestic strain limits the practical extent of the resources Islamabad can credibly project into the Middle East in the event of a large-scale conflict.
Managing Rivalries
The use of Pakistani personnel by both KSA and the UAE—two nations that experience intermittent, subtle geopolitical tensions—requires careful diplomatic management by Islamabad to avoid being inadvertently drawn into internal GCC rivalries.
The deepening KSA-Pakistan defense pact has also intensified the geopolitical calculus for Pakistan’s arch-rival, India. New Delhi is compelled to intensify its own security balancing acts, particularly with KSA, to safeguard crucial energy security interests and ensure the safety of its vast expatriate population residing across the Gulf.
VI. Conclusion
Pakistan’s security deployments constitute an essential and nuanced component of the defense architecture of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The presence of Pakistani forces is structured along two distinct lines: official, active-duty military secondment and the large-scale, yet unofficial, employment of retired military contractors.
Synthesis of Findings
- Official Secondment (Regulars): Official deployments are substantial in KSA (approximately 2,600 personnel) and Qatar (approximately 650 personnel). The mandate for these active-duty personnel is strictly advisory and training-based, as confirmed by Islamabad. However, the 2025 Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Pakistan and KSA formalizes this relationship, transforming the deployment into a political “tripwire” that significantly raises the strategic cost for any adversary considering aggression against the Kingdom.
- Private Military Contractors (PMCs): The number of retired Pakistani military officers serving in high-level advisory, technical, and operational roles across the Gulf is estimated to be in the many thousands, potentially exceeding the official deployments. This unofficial force is favored by Gulf states for cost efficiency, political deniability, and filling crucial technical gaps at a strategic level.
- The Quid Pro Quo: The relationship is a direct exchange of security for economic stability. Pakistan leverages its military expertise to secure vital economic lifelines, including financial aid and investments from KSA, UAE, and Qatar. In return, the Gulf states gain access to proven military professionalism, enhancing their deterrence capabilities and diversifying their security architecture away from singular reliance on Western powers.
The continued efficacy of Pakistan’s role hinges on its ability to navigate the inherent tension between its existential need for Gulf economic support and the need to maintain strategic autonomy, particularly regarding geopolitical flashpoints involving Iran.
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